





PROFESSIONAL NORMS IN  
AFRICAN CONTEXTS: 







WORKING PAPER SERIES 2012:10 
 
QOG THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
Box 711, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG 
October 2012 
ISSN 1653-8919 
© 2012 by Maria Gustavson. All rights reserved. 
 
  2 
Professional norms in African contexts: The forgotten dimension in development theory  
Maria Gustavson 







Western theories and Western practices have been claimed to not be appropriate in African con-
texts. The reasons are argued to be a lack of legitimacy for the practices among public officials in 
these countries, as well as a lack of empirical studies of the theories outside the West. Using gov-
ernmental audit as an area of public administration reform, the paper presents a study of African 
public audit arenas and the supreme audit institutions in Namibia and Botswana, where these ar-
guments are tested. The field work conducted consists of observations, interviews and document 
studies. The results demonstrates how professional norms and imitation which has been found to 
substantially influence professional public officials in Western countries, also play a significant role 
among African public auditors. African public auditors hold a distinct professional identity, which 
goes beyond national borders, and they continuously reform their organizations to achieve higher 
compliance with international requirements of auditing, also in disapproval with domestic politics. 
The results contrast to much in the contemporary literature describing African public officials and 
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Introduction 
Research and theories of public administration and management has been criticized for being eth-
nocentric and too focused on Western countries, neglecting other contexts and cultures (c.f. Bo-
yacigiller & Adler 1991; Candler 2002; Hou et al. 2011; Riggs 1991; Özkazanc-Pan 2008). The em-
pirical work has primarily been situated in the US or European countries and the origins of the 
scholars have in general been the same. Despite such limited cultural perspective, the research tradi-
tion has implicitly claimed universality for theories and empirical results, consequently not restricted 
the validity to merely a Western cultural context (Boyacigiller & Adler 1991). In accordance with 
this critique, a similar critique exists regarding the appropriateness of Western administrative prac-
tices in non-Western contexts (e.g. Fuseini Haruna 2003). Such criticism is noted in particular when 
public administrations in sub-Saharan African countries are discussed (c.f. Hyden 2006), where 
experiences of enforced Western administrative structures and practices have proved to be severe 
and depraving. Although some African countries have experienced prosperous development and 
general reduction in poverty, figures of the overall development in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate 
significantly lower improvements in human development than the rest of the world, across various 
dimensions (Englebert 2000; UNDP 2010; Van de Walle 2009). A key explanation to these lower 
development rates is the poor quality of the public institutions (Acemouglu, Johnson & Robinson 
2001; Diamond 2004; Rodrik, Subramanini & Trebbi 2004; World Bank 2005). Although a large 
number of capacity building projects have been undertaken, attempts to reform the administrations 
have to a much larger extent failed in Africa, than in other regions of the world (World Bank 2005).  
In search for explanations of the poor quality of the public institutions in Africa, 
several scholars argue that the historic legacies of colonial period are central for understanding the 
state and the administration in contemporary Africa. When the European colonial powers arrived 
in Africa they established a new state and administrative structures in the colonial territories and 
ignored the often complex systems of governance existing in African societies (Mamdani 1996). In 
addition to being based on a racist ideology and practice (Young 1994), these administrative struc-
tures derived from external coercion instead of domestic recognition, which contributed to their 
lack of legitimacy among the African people (Englebert 2000; 2009). This eventually created situa-
tions where formal structures became artificial and where informal, personal rule, based on kinship 
or other economic relationships govern the administrations. Since basis for legitimacy are local 
communities and personal networks and African public officials have little reason to change their 
  4 
device (Migdal 1988, p. 210), external administrative structures are likely not to succeed or be sus-
tainable.  
These historic legacies and illustrative statistics of failed programs have led many 
scholars to draw the conclusion that using administrative models with Western origins in African 
countries is problematic. Instead, African public sector organizations ought to develop their own 
administrative structures and models which would better encompass the unique character of their 
societies and which would be more legitimate in these contexts, or, at least, external models are in 
need for major adjustment to suit specific African circumstances (Abrahamsen 2000; Ake 1996; 
Diamond 2004; Englebert 2009; Fuseini Haruna 2003; Gindle 1998a; Hyden 2006; Jones & Blunt 
1993; Leonard 1987; World Bank 2005). 
Above literature, discussing public sector in African countries has primarily focused 
on coercive mechanisms in understanding how external administrative reforms have been intro-
duced in the countries. Though, turning to another approach of organizational behavior additional 
dimensions of what influences behavior and change of organizations are found highly significant. 
For the past two decades, one of the main theories of organizational behavior has been the classical 
ideas of institutional isomorphism among organizations, as presented by DiMaggio and Powell in 
1983. Since their influential article, isomorphic mechanisms and how organizations accordingly 
adapt to key institutional elements have been studied extensively, and the theoretical as well as the 
empirical scope of the research has been broadened considerably (for a review see Greenwood et 
al. 2008). An institutional isomorphic approach to organizations includes other aspects beyond 
coercion, such as professional norms and imitation. These aspects alter dimensions to perceptions 
of legitimacy, from primarily being based in the local socio political context to include professional 
communities and international influences. Although studies of these mechanisms in non-Western 
contexts have been limited, the theory implicitly claims universality, consequently claiming validity 
for the mechanisms also within the public sector in sub-Saharan Africa. The problem with both 
approaches is the lack of empirical studies on public sector officials in African countries. In particu-
lar there are few qualitative studies of African public officials’ perceptions of legitimacy in how to 
reform their organizations and how they handle administrative reforms deriving externally from a 
Western context, in relation to their local circumstances.   
The aim of this paper is to start filling this gap through presenting a study of public 
sector auditors in Sub-Saharan Africa, comprising a study of their arenas as well as two individual 
case studies of the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) in Namibia and Botswana. Contemporary 
audit is a practice with long history within Western states and these practices and structures were 
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transferred to the colonial territories in Africa during colonialism. Subsequently it constitutes an 
example of a Western administrative structure argued being problematic to use in African contexts. 
Although audit today is an internationally regulated practice, this does not change its relevance for 
representing Western structures. Due to an asymmetric balance in power between the Global 
North and the Global South, international policies are regarded in general as being products of the 
industrialized Western countries, subsequently the concepts “international” and “Western” are 
often used in parallel in the literature (c.f. Fergusson 2006; Turner & Hulme 1997; Wunsch 2000)   
In the first section of the paper the two theoretical approaches are discussed in rela-
tion to each other to extract their similarities and differences. The second section consists of a de-
scription of the cases, methods and data. In the third section, the empirical results are presented 
and interpreted. In the conclusions, I aim for an extended understanding of the relevance of West-
ern theories and practice in an African context and to bring in new perspectives on African public 
sector organizations.  
 
Theoretical background 
A key component within institutional theory is organizations’ search for legitimacy within their 
institutional context. Such legitimacy is primarily oriented towards cultural norms and values of 
expected behavior. Earlier explanations which related to technical capacity and levels of resources 
are no longer considered to be main mechanisms explaining organizational behavior. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) in their influential article identify three different forces within the institutional envi-
ronment, driving homogenization among organizations within the same organizational field; a coer-
cive, a normative and an imitative pressure. Coercive isomorphism is defined as pressure imposed 
on organizations, for instance binding regulation issued by the government. Similarly, resources 
have been argued to constitute a part of coercive pressure, although mainly in the manner where 
organizations adapt to certain structures in order to gain critical resources and not primarily how 
internal resources, such as levels of education or technical equipment, determine their actions (c.f. 
Guler et al. 2002; Sauder & Lancaster 2006). When organizations imitate other organizations, with-
out necessarily any financial incentives or regulatory obligations being involved, DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) categorize it as a process of mimetic isomorphism. Imitation may occur unintention-
ally, when practices are randomly diffused or intentionally, when organization models are spread 
and introduced, for example by consulting firms.  Imitation is to a large extent an identification 
process, where organizations imitate those with whom they identify themselves, or as Sevón (1996) 
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nicely expresses it: “Imitation is a process which begins with identification and results in transfor-
mation”. Through such an identification process, the organizations strengthen their own identity as 
part of a community of similar organizations, i.e. their organizational field. What is perceived as 
success in an organization may be related to the levels of profit the organization makes but success 
may also be defined by actors such as the state, consultancy agencies or their own associations.  
Perceptions of successful organization then spread for instance through ranking lists, guidelines of 
and handbooks of “best practices” or through associations and networks (Deephouse 1996; Galas-
kiewicz & Wasserman 1989; Haveman 1993 Slack & Hinings 1994; Wedlin 2007). In their study, 
Galaskiewicz & Wasserman (1989) demonstrate how networks and personal connections were 
important when organizations decided which organizations to imitate. When there were no clear 
guidance on how to act, managers and persons in decision-making positions tended to use their 
networks and personal connections to find the perceived appropriate practices, to which they even-
tually conformed.  
The role of networks and associations has been highlighted in particular when pro-
fessionals conform to norms and standards considered legitimate among their professional peers. 
Several scholars consider professions and professional associations to be important factors in un-
derstanding the behavior of organizations (e.g. Greenwood et al. 2002; Meyer et al. 1997; Scott 
2001). In particular two aspects of professions are conceived important for normative isomorphism 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983). First, professionals often share the same educational background. The 
common ground found in the same formal education socializes professionals into a common cul-
tural cognitive framework. Second, professionals often participate in professional networks and 
associations, which create arenas for ideas and norms to spread and to be reinforced (Gibbons 
2004; Greenwood et al. 2002). In research on non-binding regulation such as soft law, soft regula-
tion and standards, peer pressure is often highlighted as a significant mechanism for why these 
regulations are adopted by organizations (e.g. Borrás & Jacobsson 2004; Collier 2008; Mörth 2008). 
In their description of socialization processes, Berger and Luckmann (1969) stress the identification 
with significant others as a central factor when the identity of individuals is formed. Such identifica-
tion is a dual process between the subjectively experienced identity and the identification of the 
individual made by others. More recent studies also stress the relationship between work carried 
out and the subjective identity. Professional individuals tend to change their self-experienced identi-
ty to better accommodate their performed work, whenever there is a conflict between the two 
(Pratt et al. 2006). To maintain identity, there is a need for continuous confirmation of the role as 
being appropriate (Berger & Luckmann 1967). Reconfirmation occurs not only during education, 
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but also continuously by means of meetings and activities within their professional associations 
(Greenwood et al. 2002).  
Dissimilar to isomorphic pressures, influence of organizations within the same field 
is not examined in studies of the public sector in sub-Saharan African countries. Yet in a similar 
vein as institutional theory, scholars emphasize the importance of culture and norms to understand 
the behavior of these organizations, but with a significant difference; instead of searching for legit-
imacy within organizational fields, legitimacy is argued to primarily derive from local communities 
and the local norms and values. Scholars argue that African administrations are based on informal 
rules and local particularistic networks, which are more important than formal rules and regulations: 
“The abstract nature of the system underlying the ideal of a rational-legal type of bureaucracy is 
ignored in favor of the local-specific pressures and interests associated with individuals.” (Hyden 
2006 p. 56). As the quotation by Hyden (2006) illustrates, informal particularistic networks are 
claimed to have a large influence on the way African public sector organizations operate. In differ-
ence to normative isomorphic pressure, these networks are not based on professionalism, rather 
organized in patrimonial structures through ethnicity or kinship (Bayart 2009). Patrimonial struc-
tures are highly unequal and the rules are highly personalized around a “big man.” People not in-
cluded in these networks may not expect any rights or any privileges, while persons included are 
highly dependent on the benevolence of the big man (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997).  
Although several scholars claim that these are typical features of the African public 
sector, which has led to economic stagnation, lack of development and redistribution of public 
goods turning them into private goods in many African countries (Diamond 2010; Sandbrook 1984; 
Van de Walle 2004), others argue that these are not specific African characteristics but features that 
exist and have existed in many political systems throughout history. Instead, the reason for why the 
effects of these structures are so devastating for African countries is to be understood as being due 
to their general underdevelopment and lack of individual opportunities outside these structures 
(Szeftel 1998).  
Contemporary state and administrative structures are thus argued to be merely arti-
ficial and true loyalty and legitimacy for the acting of the public organizations are rather to be found 
within the local communities. Ekeh (1975) argues in his seminal work that the contemporary state 
and its resources is regarded as a source to exploit, the public officials instead demonstrate their 
loyalty towards networks existing before the colonial period which within the modern state still 
exists in parallel with the formal administrative structures.  An alternative understanding, rather 
than being deeply rooted in African societies, is to explain the importance of informality and per-
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sonal rule on behalf of the more impersonal, formal rule of law, in terms of the historic legacies of 
colonialism and the European influence in Africa. Mamdani (1996) illustrates how Europeans when 
they arrived on the African continent, ignored complex traditional systems in which chiefs and 
kings governed and which contained sophisticated procedures for restricting the power of the rul-
ers. Instead the colonial powers selected ordinary members in the societies to become administra-
tive chiefs, superior to the traditional, hereditary rulers. These new administrative chiefs held exten-
sive powers over their societies, which created tensions within colonial societies between the ad-
ministrative authority and the rest of the kin groups and as Mamdani (1996) argues, such all-
encompassing authority merged into to one public position inevitably leads to abuse. These admin-
istrative chiefs gained the positions of what eventually became to be the so-called “big men”, and 
their patronage networks developed and grew into the contemporary bureaucratic systems (Fuku-
yama 2010, p. 69).  
The specific administrative culture and history of Africa described above had led 
many scholars to draw the same conclusion as Bayart (2009), who claims that African societies have 
a specific history that makes their institutions work differently than in other societies and that it 
would be wrong to believe that concepts and ideas would be understood in the same way in these 
societies as they are in another context, due to this specific historic legacy (p. 268-271). Since West-
ern models do not reflect the basic values of African societies, there will be little loyalty and legiti-
macy for them (Ayittey 2006; Carlsson 1998; Englebert 2009). For instance, Englebert (2009) sug-
gests that the main reason for state failures in Africa is due to their lack of domestic legitimacy, 
which in turn derives from the externally imposed nature of the state. He claims that African state 
sovereignty does not derive from domestic recognition or from a social contract between the citi-
zens and the state. Instead, the legitimacy of African states is only based on international acknowl-
edgment, consequently their citizens offer little support and loyalty towards them. A logic conse-
quence following such arguments would then be what Leonard (1987) expresses; that due to the 
social realities in African societies, it would be naïve to believe that Western administrative practices 
could be transferred to this context (Leonard 1987, p. 908; see also Dia 1996).  
In cases where resemblance with administrative structures in Western countries are 
found, these features are in general claimed to be merely artificial and not truly impact the actions 
in the organizations (c. f. Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Diamond 2010; Ekeh 1975; Hyden 2006). 
An exception mentioned in the literature is elite groups, who are argued to more willingly imitate 
Western behavior; however, they are regarded as small exclusive groups, in general educated abroad 
in Western countries (c.f. Bayart 2009, p. 27; Ekeh 1975; Englebert 2000; Young 2001). Conse-
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quently, the actions of elite groups are not regarded as representing general public officials, nor are 
their actions discussed as influencing African public administrations to any great extent.   
As discussed in previous sections, scholars assessing the features of public sector 
organizations in sub-Saharan Africa argue that as a result of external pressures African public ad-
ministrations have adopted Western structures merely on the surface and they argued act very dif-
ferently in practice (e.g. De Sardan 1999; Ekeh, 1975; Bratton & Van de Walle 1997). Within insti-
tutional theory such behavior among organizations is conceptualized as processes of decoupling. 
Institutional scholars argue that as a consequence of the importance for organizations to adapt 
certain structures to gain legitimacy, they decouple formal structures from the actual practices, i.e. 
they use the structures they need for legitimacy as mainly ceremonial and do not necessarily change 
their practices. This may lead to a situation where organizations look similar on the surface but act 
very differently in practice (Meyer & Rowan 1977). Although the theoretical understandings are 
fairly similar in this aspect, there is a significant difference between the two traditions. When dis-
cussing the specific nature of African public administrations, scholars make a distinction between West-
ern and African countries, where they argue that Western structures are difficult to implement in Afri-
can organizations. Within this tradition, it is not argued that all organizations separate structure 
from practices rather this phenomenon is to be regarded as specifically African and a consequence 
of the inappropriate structures. On the other hand, within institutional theory, no distinction is 
made between Western and African organizations, rather all organizations around the world are argued 
to search for legitimacy within their institutional environment and as a result also decouple struc-
tures from practices.  
Although the mechanisms driving action and change in organizations in both bodies 
of literature are regarded to be the result of an underlying search for legitimacy within their envi-
ronment, in the development literature legitimacy is primarily directed towards and restricted to the 
organization’s African environment. Here, the actions of the public officials are consequences of 
their need for legitimacy within their African social structures, thereof the different actions than 
those prescribed by the foreign structures (c.f. De Sardan 1999; Ekeh 1975) In addition, scholars 
emphasize the importance of reforms being legitimate in the African context (Abrahamsen 2000; 
Hyden 2006). There is thus little discussion of how African public officials as professionals would 
search for legitimacy within a professional community also internationally. Correspondingly, there 
is little discussion of how public officials in Africa may regard their organization within a field of 
similar organizations around the world and accordingly search for legitimacy within their field by 
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imitating organizations that are more successful and being sensitive to ranking lists and notions of 
guidelines of best practice outlined by a profession.  
An exception is when Hilderbrand and Grindle (1998) discuss factors in successful 
public administration reforms in developing countries. In their case studies they found that if a 
professional identity and a sense of a professional community existed among the public officials, 
the organizations performed better. Additionally, Leonard (1987) argues that many African manag-
ers have a professional commitment, which may be reinforced through networks and conferences, 
where these professional values are shared. Still, he also argues for the importance of the African 
managers’ local social identity and, although he claims that African public administration is best 
understood by a combination of universal organization theory and the sociology of Africa (p. 906), 
he argues strongly throughout his article that it is difficult to transfer Western management tech-
niques, since they are not appropriate solutions in African public administrations (Leonard 1987).  
To highlight the professional role for public officials in African countries is within 
this research tradition yet an exception. The main approach is rather that foreign, more Western 
like, structures are adapted in African administrations predominantly as a consequence of coercive 
pressures, where the literature illustrates how administrative reforms from the days of colonialism 
to economic reforms as structural adjustment programs have been forced externally upon the Afri-
can continent. Alternatively, reforms are regarded as a result of coercive pressures from donors. As 
Leonard (1987) states: “Thus real reform is likely to occur only in circumstances such as credible 
donor threats to terminate support and severe financial stringency for the state” (p. 907). Although 
all these scholars provide valuable insights of the history and the development of the African state 
and administration, they do not investigate how public officials in the contemporary African state 
act to reform their organizations or what they perceive as legitimate practices. Similarly, though a 
comprehensive range of empirical studies illustrate the significance of isomorphic pressures in the 
Western world; few of these insights have been based on studies conducted in sub-Saharan African 
countries. Consequently there is little knowledge to what extent this Western-based theory is valid 
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Key research questions to be answered within the study are as follows: 
 
1. How do the public auditors perceive what is legitimate audit practices?  
2. How are their actions shaped by international professional ideas and local circumstances?  
3. Could possible difficulties in implementing audit structures and practices in line with inter-
national standards be related to differences in the administrative cultural context between 
West and Africa   
 
Methodology 
Focus in the study is on a deeper understanding of the complexity of the phenomenon, which leads 
to choosing a few qualitative cases (Merriam 2009; Yin 1994). The first case is the arenas, where 
auditors from Supreme Audit Institutions in African countries meet and interact. The arenas consti-
tute African regional groups in the standard-making organization for state audit organizations, IN-
TOSAI. These regional organizations have to administer the international standards in relation to 
their African member organizations, and the activities within the arenas could be expected to ex-
pose how the international standards are discussed and treated by participants from various African 
countries. Arena in the study is defined as organizations that: “produce and provide information 
and comparisons, report and propose initiatives for change and generally facilitate exchange of 
experiences, ideas, and ideals” (Sahlin-Andersson 2000, p. 100). The two African regional organiza-
tions that were used as arenas were the African Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions in Eng-
lish-speaking Africa (AFROSAI-E) and the African Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions 
(AFROSAI). The empirical study focuses on a number of activities and individuals within these 
organizations, such  as courses, conferences, training courses and meetings, as a consequence the 
study has a stronger focus on the sub-regional group, AFROSAI-E, since they performed a larger 
number of activities in the region.  
The fieldwork conducted at the arenas consists of observations, semi-structured in-
terviews, document studies and a number of informal conversations. The idea of starting the study 
with an open approach using multiple sources was to create a broad understanding of the context, 
in order to avoid a too narrow approach and instead enable a more open approach for possible 
variety in the empirical setting. To gain access to arenas for African public auditors, a visit was 
made to the secretariat of AFROSAI-E. Through the regional secretariat, there were opportunities 
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to visit and observe conferences, training courses and meetings within the regional cooperation, 
conduct personal interviews, more informal conversations, as well as to examine their documents. 1  
 In the field notes from the observations, attention was paid to, and extensive notes 
were taken on how the auditors talked and acted, about the relationship between the sub-Saharan 
African context and the international audit standards. In addition, my own reflections on the situa-
tions were written down (Burgess 1984). Throughout the study, in interviews, informal conversa-
tions and during the observations, the purpose of the study was always made clear, and coffee and 
lunch breaks were used for informal conversations with auditors about their views and opinions of 
the standards and the situation in their countries, as well as the activities they participated in. In 
addition, access to all events was permitted by the regional secretariat. In this sense, the observa-
tions are to be regarded as open. However, in the larger events, such as the AFROSAI assembly or 
the AFROSAI-E performance audit course, the events were so large that it was possible to blend in 
with the participants and since I was not introduced, those I did not talk to were probably unaware 
of the observation (c.f. Burgess 1984).  The sources were used in parallel for confirmation and to 
identify possible alternative explanations or contradictions (Yin 2009). The multiple sources were 
also used additively, i.e. the information from one interview, or reflections from an observation, 
was used in the next interview. Examine their documents in parallel with conducting the interviews 
also created possibilities for questions concerning the information provided by the documents. 
The interviews at the arenas were semi-structured and centered around the [1] role 
of AFROSAI-E in relation to the SAIs in the region [2] adjustments of the standards to circum-
stances in the countries in the region [4] benefits and difficulties in similar and dissimilar audit 
structures and practices in the world. In the interviews, questions regarding facts as well as ques-
tions about their views and opinion were included (Burgess 1984). All interviews were recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. All data collection at the arenas was conducted in South Africa, October - 
December 2008. 
The second and third cases in the study consist of studies of the SAIs in Namibia 
and Botswana. Although the study of the arenas provides valuable information about the sub-
Saharan African context of public auditors, it is at the level of individual organizations that auditors 
actually have to handle their domestic circumstances in relation to the international standards if 
they attempt to implement the standards. In Namibia and Botswana, two rounds of semi-structured 
interviews were conducted at the Supreme Audit Institutions, the first in June and July 2009, and 
                                                     
1
 A detailed list over observations, interviews and documents studied is provided in the Appendix 
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the second in October and November 2010. In the first round of interviews, the interviews were 
recorded and transcribed verbatim and during the second field trip, the interviews were written 
down as field notes and transcribed shortly after the interview took place. The reason for not re-
cording the interviews during the second round of interviews was due to the already large amount 
of empirical data collected. There was a strong familiarity with the area, several facts had already 
been exposed and some only needed to be confirmed and described more explicitly. In addition, 
although with some exceptions, in general the auditors interviewed had been educated in Namibia 
and Botswana, respectively.  
 The questions in the interview guides used for this paper focus on [1] their background in the of-
fice and how they were introduced to the work [2] how the work has changed during their time at 
the office [3] the introduction and use of manuals and working papers [4] the character of devel-
opment cooperation projects undertaken during the years [5] the relationship between what is ex-
pected from the international standards and their local circumstances [6] harmonization and cus-
tomization  [7] possibilities of creating standards that encompass the specific character of their 
society  [8] benefits and difficulties in similar and dissimilar audit structures and practices in the 
world.2 
Overall for the three case studies approximately hundred hours of observation was 
carried out, fifty-seven personal interviews were conducted with forty-six auditors and managers at 
various positions within the regional organization AFROSAI-E and the SAIs in Botswana and 
Namibia.  To create a situation where the people interviewed could speak more freely about their 
thoughts and experiences, they were promised confidentiality, i.e. that no names would be written 
in the published study, instead all interviews would be numbered. Additionally, the individuals in-
terviewed have been allowed to review the quotations taken from their interview and agree to them 






                                                     
2
 This paper build on a limited number of questions used in a larger study where other aspects of the development of 
the SAIs also were examined  
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Empirical results 
International audit standards in African contexts: Public audit arenas 
 
A core activity for the regional organization AFROSAI-E has been the production of guidance 
material, for instance manuals on regularity audit and performance audit as well as document where 
experiences from SAIs in the region perceived as successful by the regional secretariat are presented 
as “lessons learnt”. Interviews with managers at the regional secretariat revealed a distinct ambition 
to harmonize audit structures and practices among all SAIs in the region, and make them work 
more in accordance with the international standards and all guidance material, based on the stand-
ards, constituted an important part in this process. To harmonize audit practices in line with the 
standards occasionally implied to counteract prevailing local norms of auditing in the region which 
were not in accordance with international standards. This became particular significant during an 
observation of a technical committee meeting when design of reporting guidelines was discussed:  
 
Participant A: “People are doing this in many different ways that is why we have created this 
guideline. We shall not encourage the norm of reporting. The norm is to produce one report 
on the entire government. We write that they should do it differently, even if we know that 
they do it in a different way in the region. We will write this now and try to make it go in that 
direction.” The discussion continues about practices in the various countries. Participant A: 
“The motive for guidelines is for us to use the same system. We have to check the IBSAs and 
say [to the SAIs] that you are doing the wrong thing” All the other participants disagree: “We 
shall not say that they do ‘the wrong thing’, rather say ‘you don't comply with the standards’” 
 (AFROSAI-E Technical Committee meeting)  
 
The managers at the secretariat were well aware of their limited authority over the members. While 
they desire the members to move in certain directions to achieve a higher compliance with the in-
ternational standards, they have no true authority or any means of enforcement to make the mem-
bers comply. Instead, as illustrated by the quotation above, their identified way of changing local 
norms was to convince the members through appealing to professional norms for auditors to fol-
low the international standards (c.f. Borrás & Jacobsson 2004; Scott 2001).  
Despite the quest of harmonizing audit structures and practices, a certain ambiguity 
was present in the interviews with the manages at the secretariat, illustrated in the manner by which 
they simultaneously argued how each country needed to customize the guidelines to their local 
circumstances. Throughout the study of the arenas, this notion of customization to local circum-
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stances arose both in the written guidance documents and when compliance with international 
standards were discussed at courses and conferences. 3  
 
 
The guidance and working papers of the regularity manual reflect international requirements, 
or draw on best practices to enhance the efficiency of the audit performed. However, there are 
numerous differences between SAIs in terms of mandate, legislative environment, organisa-
tional structures etc. the manual may need to be adapted to the individual circumstances of 
each SAI 
 
(AFROSAI (2008) Regularity Audit Manual, p. 10)  
 
 
As illustrated by the quotation, local circumstances are described as different mandates for each 
SAI, or different legal systems that may lead to variation when standards are implemented. Similar 
descriptions were given in interviews and in informal conversations with participants at the tech-
nical update workshop and the performance audit course.4 When the auditors were asked to explain 
this ambiguity and asked to give more specific examples of what such customization could consist 
of, they argued that the main differences between the countries was their size and the levels of de-
velopment in the organizations. Accordingly customization consisted of adapting to the national 
legislation and the different mandate for the SAIs which, from the auditors’ perspective, were mi-
nor matters which did not imply any large deviations from the standards.5 The core emphasis was 
still on complying with international standards as far as possible. Conducting their work in accord-
ance with these standards would guarantee a “best practices” accepted around the world and the 
auditors appeared to consider it necessary to comply with them, in order to be professional.6  
Even though recognition of differences among countries existed, the character of 
the differences was not argued or discussed as constituting differences in administrative and politi-
cal culture between West and Africa. Additionally, the idea that the standards would be problematic 
in African contexts due to their origins in the Western world, alternatively a Western dominated 
international community, was entirely absent in interviews, observations, informal conversations as 
well as in the documents.  
                                                     
3
 Observation Technical update, Observation Performance Audit course, AFROSAI-E Regularity Audit Manual,  
4
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The auditors were more interested in emphasizing similarities in their situations as 
auditors. Despite working in different countries they argued that they face the same problems of 
high staff turnover and, as the auditors at the performance audit course claimed, faced problem 
with having incompetent managers hampering the development in their offices.7 The idea of devel-
oping their own unique solutions in line with their local circumstances (c.f. Diamond 2004, p. 279; 
Fuseini Haruna 2003; Leonard 1987, p. 908), was not present during the observations or interviews. 
By contrast, the auditors rather appeared to regard the use of practices and experiences of other 
SAIs as helpful, when they were to develop their own organization. The following example is from a 
presentation of a report about establishing a new performance audit unit in a SAI within the region: 
 
Now when we start we have to look at other SAIs and what they have done. Like country B, 
they have been doing this for fifteen years, also country C, we must learn from them. What 
were their restraints and difficulties, we have to look at how they did things. /…/ Under op-
portunities [we have written]: an international trend, everyone else is doing it, why not us? 
Now we want your help to identify how we should set up this unit”.  
 
(Observation AFROSAI-E Training course for managers in performance auditing)  
 
The overall results from the arenas demonstrate the significance of the professional norms in the 
sub-Saharan African contexts. The professional community of auditors is regarded by the African 
auditors as an essential source of legitimacy, where they view the international formulated standards 
as the most appropriate audit practices and they continuously imitate the other SAIs. Instead of 
regarding the use of similar practices worldwide as problematic, the auditors sought advice for ap-
propriate strategies among their professional peers in other countries.   
 
International audit standards in African country contexts the case of 
Botswana and Namibia 
To conduct audit in accordance with the international audit standards were by auditors both at the 
SAI in Namibia and the SAI in Botswana regarded as an expected consequence of their profession. 
Following international standards in their work implied a higher level of unification within the of-
fice of the work carried out, which was regarded positively. From their perspective, the use of 
standards would also facilitate their recognition of the appropriate level in how their work should 
be done. Without using common standards, the work in the office was viewed as being unsystemat-
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ic where different sections could work in different ways. “If there was no manual [based on the 
international standards], one would say this, another would say that and there would be no clear 
guidance”8. To be able to use already defined practices and structures for the audit process was a 
possibility for them to benefit from research and developed models already made by other auditors, 
instead of having to spend resources to develop their own kind of methodology. Significant for the 
answers provided by the auditors was expressed the following way by an auditor: “Why should you 
deviate when there already are recognized best practices? Why should you invent the wheel when it 
is already there?” 9 Subsequently, in both organizations attitudes towards international audit stand-
ards were rather uncomplicated, and the use of standards was regarded as improving the quality in 
their daily work10. An auditor claimed that the only disadvantage for using similar audit practices 
around the world would be if a country performed badly and did not want to demonstrate this in 
their accounts. In such cases, if the country used its own kind of audit practices it would be possi-
ble for the country to hide behind their own created versions of audit. This scenario was not dis-
cussed as a desirable situation. For the auditor, instead it became another argument for the im-
portance of a common understanding of audit practices on international level.11  
The advantages of using the same audit structures and practices around the world 
are also expressed in more individual aspects. Similar systems and practices among the Supreme 
Audit Institutions around the world would open up opportunities for the auditors in Namibia and 
Botswana since then they could go anywhere in the world to work, as well as being able to work as 
auditors within international organizations such as the UN, which appoints auditors for interna-
tional assignments.12 Beyond individual advantages, the common understanding of audit among 
Supreme Audit Institutions around the world also means possibilities to cooperate between the 
organizations. Primarily the auditors stressed the regional cooperation and presented various exam-
ples of how they had cooperated within the region, for instance regarding computer programs, 
training courses and workshops and at the SAI in Namibia they had sent auditors to other SAIs in 
Africa, in need for assistance.  
Answers in interviews regarding customization of the international standards to specific local cir-
cumstances in their countries were very similar to the answers provided at the arenas. The main 
approach among the auditors was that, apart from how the standards have to be in line with the 
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national legislation, customization mainly comprised minor more technical aspects. For example 
both the Botswana and Namibian government uses a cash based accounting system, and the stand-
ards are designed for an accrual system, which means that they cannot use the working papers for 
balance sheets.13 At the SAI in Botswana, difficulties to fulfill the requirements in the standards 
were also argued to be a consequence of limited competence. As a senior manager replied: “You 
only have these people, whether the people have the competences for this audit or not. You just 
have to make go with them. That is really the main thing.” 14  
 
Fragmentation and cohesion as institutional change in  
Namibia and Botswana 
Throughout the years both national audit offices have implemented or tried to implement several 
reforms in order to achieve a higher compliance with the international public audit standards. This 
becomes manifest when several concrete aspects of standards are discussed in interviews, and when 
peer reviews of their offices were studied.15  
When Namibia became independent in 1990 a major development program fi-
nanced by the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) started, in order to strengthen the 
capacity of the public administration in the country. The focus was on three main areas, central 
banking, statistics and the national audit office. An evaluation made of the audit office by the time 
demonstrates a limited number of qualified auditors and large problems of recruiting and retaining 
qualified staff. Evaluators of the office concluded that the office was far from reaching the audit 
techniques and methodologies used in the private sector and in developing countries (Bergström 
2008). The overall program divided in different sub-project eventually came to last between 1994 
and 2006. Identifying a shortage of appropriate skills in audit methodologies, the program focused 
on training all staff at all levels of the organization with a combination of theoretical guidance and 
everyday “on the job training,” where the auditors could apply the new theory in their everyday 
work. The project was built around a project team of four long-term advisers who worked in the 
office throughout the whole program to achieve continuous training and guidance.16 To avoid the 
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risk of creating dependency on the external advisers and instead make management the focal point 
to which the staff would turn in need for guidance, the program included a particular focus on 
educating the middle and senior management, who gradually took over the responsibility of training 
their staff at the office. Involvement in the regional network AFROSAI-E in 2004 also resulted in 
educational occasions for the auditors. Understood by interviews made with auditors at the office, 
the OAG today holds a unified approach to the work and the middle management continuously 
educate and apprise the auditors on the most recent standards. In the latest peer review, the OAG 
of Namibia is also complimented for the increased use of standardized working papers based on 
the international standards, as well as using a well-structured audit planning process, according to 
the standards17  
The development of the SAI in Botswana is to a certain extent different, and the 
approach towards the use of international audit standards has been more fragmented. Since inde-
pendence in 1966 auditors at the SAI have participated in various short term and long term courses 
in order to raise the levels of competence in the office. Such courses have been carried out within 
the International Development Initiative (IDI) which is a development initiative among the INTO-
SAI community, within the regional framework AFROSAI-E as well as within bilateral cooperation 
with the Swedish National Audit Office and with other SAIs in the world. These projects have 
aimed at increasing performance in various areas of the office, for instance the levels of education 
in accounting and auditing, establishing a performance audit unit, improved administrative skills, 
and most recently, an investment in audit software, where manuals and working papers based on 
the international standards are integrated in the software program. Regardless of all projects and 
programs undertaken throughout the years, auditors at the office acknowledged an absence of co-
hesion in the methodology used , and methodologies according to standards were used to a varied 
degree between units and auditors in the office. An auditor expresses the situation the following 
way: “The office is always talking about the standards. It is only that the staff are not really aware of 
the standards”18. What this auditor articulates may be compared to how an auditor at the SAI in 
Namibia expresses their compliance with audit standards, decided on by management: “It is com-
pulsory, you have to do it that way. If you don’t do it, you are wasting your time because you have 
to redo the work”19 
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As illustrated by the presentation of the development of the two offices, the SAIs in 
Namibia and Botswana continuously act to create change in their organizations for achieving com-
pliance with the standards. The differences between the offices are though noteworthy. Naturally 
the development of the SAI in Namibia was not friction free. The first adaptation of an audit man-
ual in the office was resisted by the auditors as well as the continuous changes of work methodolo-
gies in line with changes and updates of the international standards is described not be received 
with any greater enthusiasm among the auditors. The explanations given for this has nonetheless 
little to do with the standards being Western originated and consequently ill-suited for the African 
context, rather the auditors state that constant changes in work methodologies imply a constant 
increase of their workload, including more detailed planning processes and more extensive docu-
mentation, and how re-learning a methodology in conducting their work is a time consuming activi-
ty, on top of their existing assignment. The manual, which first was resisted due to the reasons 
discussed above, was eventually adopted and used by the auditors in the office. The shift from an 
initial resistance to acceptance is explained to be a consequence of the auditors’ understanding in 
how the new procedures were requirements in the international audit standards and not ideas from 
management in the office. This is argued to have shifted the auditors’ attitudes and was followed by 
a cohesive adoption of the manual at the SAI in Namibia.20   
Indeed, auditors at the SAI in Botswana argued similarly to the auditors in Namibia 
that their resistance to change their way of working was a consequence of the increased workload 
imposed to them. There are thus significant differences in how the SAI in Botswana have handled 
the introduction of new work procedures according to the international audit standards. Over the 
years, the auditors’ education about the content in the standards has been more fragmented, and an 
underestimation of time and support required for implementing new work procedures becomes 
apparent. The principal approach by which education and change of work methodologies has been 
undertaken within the office has been a so called “training of trainors”. A limited number of audi-
tors in the office are educated on the new methodology within or outside the office, then they are 
expected to educate their fellow auditors in the office on the new methodology, and eventually and 
change the work procedures for the whole office. Auditors who had attended such workshops 
argue that such short courses were insufficient and how it was very difficult for them to actually 
change anything in the office after the training21. A significant example of how efforts made by the 
SAIs to reform the office have been problematic is the most recent larger attempt to implement the 
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use of the audit software TeamMate. The inconsistent use of the system found in the office was 
explained by underestimation of education needed and an absence of support when facing prob-
lems. No one in the office had any previous experiences of the system, not the auditors nor the 
management consequently there was no one to turn to when facing difficulties.22  
Another dimension to the more limited use of international standards in Botswana’s supreme audit 
institution is how the increased transparency, which follows by an increased use of detailed plan-
ning processes and standardized working procedures which are all documented, implied a loss of 
power and influence for managers. Several managers were employed when general levels of persons 
recruited to the office were much lower than today, subsequently lacked the appropriate knowledge 
and skills in auditing. The use of standardized work procedures according to standards would make 
the work of auditors at all positions more visible, thus any shortage in skills would be more obvi-
ous. It was argued that this was a main mechanism for why a change to the new procedures was 
resisted by many managers. Although auditors recruited in recent years held higher levels of educa-
tion and have more technical skills and thereby argued to more easily adapt to new methodologies, 
due to hierarchic structures and the stronger positions of managers, the SAI had difficulties in cre-




Legitimacy and the significance of professional norms 
 
It is clear that professional norms exist among auditors in Sub-Saharan Africa, which affect their 
attitudes and actions in reforming their organizations. In line with what studies have demonstrated 
on the acting of professionals in Western contexts, similar devices are found at the public audit 
arenas as well as in the individual Supreme Audit Institutions of Namibia and Botswana. Through-
out the study, auditors at the arenas as well as at the SAIs of Namibia and Botswana argued how 
existing best practices in auditing, elaborated by the profession, was unproblematic and how fol-
lowing such practices was part of their professional identity (c.f. DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Green-
wood, Suddaby & Hinings 2002; Scott 2001). There was little support in empirical results for a state 
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of affairs where the auditors would like to have a specific African way of conducting audit, or build-
ing audit structures on traditional domestic institutions. On the contrary, the interviews and obser-
vations demonstrated how the auditors regarded it as an advantage to use common international 
practice, and how they preferred to follow these practices, rather than responding to their own 
domestic circumstances.  
The acting of the SAIs in Namibia and Botswana and how the auditors discuss the 
standards may similarly be interpreted as illustrating high legitimacy for the international standards. 
Auditors working in these organizations regarded the use of work procedures according to interna-
tional standards as improving the performance in their office and they argue for the unnecessary in 
developing unique models, when a “best practice” already was established. As argued by Kennedy 
and Fiss (2009) performance improvements may be important motives for organizations adopting 
certain practices, apart from their wish to be socially legitimate. 
Reforms undertaken throughout the years also mirror the organizations ambitions 
to create change in line with the standards. Although the implementation of work procedures in 
accordance with standards have been carried out to a varied degree between the two SAIs, reasons 
for resistance and fragmented implementation are difficult to relate to lack of legitimacy for the 
standards or to specific cultural differences between West and Africa, however. Increased workload 
in combination with insufficient support, as well as lack of appropriate skills in particular within key 
groups at the office, are rather explanations found in the study. The lower levels of education 
among persons employed several years ago, today in general found at management level in the SAI 
of Botswana may be considered as a local circumstance which affects how the work is carried out 
today. By other auditors in the office, this was however considered to be a problematic situation in 
need for change, to improve the work according to standards. This attitude is much in contrast to 
how the question of adaptation to local circumstances is framed within the literature, where the 
standards would be subject for change rather than the local situation. At the SAI in Namibia man-
agers were early identified as a key group in the development projects and a strategy to handle this 
was to focus on them in particular and build the training structures within the office centered on 
them. In comparison with the development of the SAI in Botswana, this appears to have led to the 
more cohesive approach to the work and the international standards. 
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Harmonization and customization: Ambiguity revealing a moral  
dimension? 
Although the ambition of the AFROSAI-E regional secretariat could be understood as strict an 
inflexible respecting the importance of following the requirements in the standards, the documents 
produced within the AFROSAI-E emphasize the importance of customizing the standards and 
guidelines to the local circumstances in each country. Hence, there is a certain ambiguity in the 
organizations’ authority towards their members, i.e. on the one hand they strongly encourage their 
members to comply with all requirements in the standards, on the other there is a certain amount 
of flexibility in the standards and guidelines by the means of the notion of customization. The fo-
cus on customization may be interpreted as a as the way of balancing authority between volunta-
rism and compliance with common rules (c.f. Ahrne & Brunsson 2008). Through constantly apply-
ing notions of customization, it may be regarded as less of a commitment for members to adapt the 
regulation, since there will be a flexibility in how to follow them (c.f. Abbott & Snidal 2000). The 
notion of customization could also be interpreted as a similar expression of the awareness of the 
differences between developing and industrialized countries, or between Africa and West, as ex-
pressed in much literature. Still, an important difference exists between the auditors’ notion of cus-
tomization and the means by which the argument of the importance of adjustments to specific 
circumstances are advanced in the literature.  When customization is discussed within the audit 
community, it is argued that each country within the region needs to customize the adaptation of 
standards to their own circumstances. This is a significant difference from the idea that there being 
specific African circumstances that make international standards difficult to implement. The dis-
tinction between West and Africa in terms of different political and cultural circumstances is quite 
simply not made by the auditors. 
Customization may on the other hand be interpreted as a way to handle a moral di-
mension in administrative reforms. An underlying value in the understanding of what is claimed to 
be lack of legitimacy for Western administrative structures and practices, is the manner by which 
the use of such derives from a history of imperialistic coercion. The ambiguity in ambitions to har-
monize while emphasizing voluntarism and customization to circumstances in each country may 
reflect awareness of this moral dimension. To avoid critique for being imperialistic and coercive 
and instead strengthen domestic legitimacy with respect to the standards and guidance material, 
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customization is stressed as a mean to make the guidelines country specific and thereby better 
owned by the country.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Western theory and practices in African contexts 
 
In a similar manner by which it would be inappropriate to assume that theories and concepts de-
veloped in Western countries are valid in different contexts with a different historical and institu-
tional development, it is also remarkable to assume that behavior found valid among organizations 
and professionals in one part of the world would change substantially merely due to the geograph-
ical location. This study has illustrated how auditors in African states appear to act very similar to 
what have been observed mechanisms among professionals in Western countries. As professional 
associations in Western contexts have been demonstrated to use guidelines, standards and percep-
tions of successful organizations as means to voluntarily push member organizations in the desired 
direction, a similar behavior is observed in African professional associations of auditing. In line 
with observations made in Western contexts, professionals and organizations in African countries 
being subjects to these pressures of norms and imitation demonstrate attitudes and undertake re-
forms which illustrate that perception of legitimacy in how their work should be conducted derive 
primarily from their organizational field. Local circumstances hampering the use of work proce-
dures according to standards, such as in adequate competence or insufficient support, were regard-
ed in general as problematic situations to overcome. In addition, there appear to be little conflict 
between domestic legitimacy and legitimacy within an organizational field on international level, as 
argued by scholars are reasons for the failure of African states (c.f. Englebert 2000; 2009). The au-
ditors rather argue how the use of international practices of auditing, through better executed au-
dits, would better guarantee that the citizens’ money are properly used and accounted for. This in 
turn could be expected to imply high legitimacy for the use of such standards among citizens in 
their countries.   
In this paper I have argued that the main processes in shaping the African auditors’ 
perceptions and actions are consequences of voluntary mechanisms, i.e. professional norms and 
imitation, and not coercive pressures. Could it not then be argued that gaining critical resources, 
and thereby being subject of coercive pressure, is the main driving mechanism for change and 
compliance with standards in these cases? Although the SAI of Namibia from independence initial-
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ly received large support for their office from a donor country which affected the direction of their 
office, this support is today terminated and the office receives its budget from the Namibian gov-
ernment. A senior manager at the Namibian SAI mentions donors as a reason for why the office 
aims at complying with international standards. He is however an exception. In the other interviews 
donors are not brought up, rather a professional commitment as auditors appears to shape their 
perceptions and actions. Moreover, even though the SAI of Botswana has participated in various 
development cooperation programs, it is a comparatively rich country in Africa and the office today 
receives, to my knowledge, little financial support from donors. Instead, as the SAI of Namibia they 
receive their budget from the government and have to comply with national rules and regulation. 
Neither was donors brought up within AFROSAI-E as reasons for adapting the international 
standards, but during the observed conference for the Auditors Generals of all African countries, 
the AFROSAI congress, donors were often mentioned in the discussions, however not understood 
as reasons for using standards but rather as a part of their audit environment.23 For instance, it was 
regarded problematic to audit hospitals and health clinics due to the large amount of donor funded 
medication and equipment. In these situations, the auditors had difficulties in controlling the eco-
nomic transactions, since there was a mix of public funds and donor funds and the staff at the hos-
pital could refer to the foreign partner for the data on the equipment. Consequently, yet donors and 
donor funding appear to be a significant part of the audit environment in several African countries, 
the impression from the observations at the congress was that this situation did not impact on the 
way auditors related to the use of international standards.24  
While access to critical resources have been proven to be a significant mechanism 
for explaining organizational behavior (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Guler, Guillén & Muir Macpher-
son 2002 ), scholars within this strand of literature on organizations argue that resources and as-
pects regarding the technical capacity and the production are in general no longer the main drivers 
for reforms in organizations; rather organizations adapt to more cultural cognitive ideas of what is 
the appropriate behavior for an organization of their kind (c.f. Meyer & Rowan 1977). In contrast 
to the situation in industrialized Western countries, where these arguments are developed, lack of 
resources and limited technical capacity remain significant explanations for how African public 
organizations respond, and are able to respond, to foreign ideas and practices (e.g. Grindle 1998b; 
Turner & Hulme 1997; World Bank 2005). In this study, educational levels and insufficient support 
have been demonstrated to hamper the organizations desire to develop in a certain direction de-
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spite the development being socially legitimate. In addition, lack of adequate capacity may however 
also increase legitimacy for using the international standards. Several auditors argued how it was 
unnecessary for them to develop their own unique models auditing since that would require re-
sources which they did not find available. The pooling of resources made possible through similar 
work procedures in the region was experienced as helpful, subsequently most likely strengthened 
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APPENDIX  
Documents 
AFROSAI-E (2006) Corporate Plan and Budget for 2007-2009 
AFROSAI-E (2006) Report on Independent Mid-term Review 
AFROSAI-E (2008) Annual report for 2007 and Work Plan for 2008  
AFROSAI-E (2007) Transversal Activity Report of the Supreme Audit Institutions in the 
AFROSAI-E region  
AFROSAI-E (2008) Regularity Audit Manual 2006 (amended 2008) 
AFROSAI-E (2007) Performance Audit Manual  
AFROSAI-E (2008) Developing Performance Audit. Lessons Learnt from the Office of 
the Auditor General of Botswana 
AFROSAI-E (2009) Quality Assurance Support Visit to the Supreme Audit Institution of Botswana. 
Pretoria: AFROSAI-E Secretariat.  
AFROSAI-E. (2007) Quality Assurance Support Visit to the Supreme Audit Institution of Namibia. 
Pretoria: AFROSAI-E Secretariat. 
Bergström, Lage. 2008. Learning from Experience. Namibia – Sweden Development  
Cooperation in the area of Public Administration 1990-2006. Sida: Stockholm 
 
Observations 
11th AFROSAI Assembly, Pretoria, South Africa, October 13-17, 2008, 2.5 days  
AFROSAI-E Technical committee meeting, Pretoria, South Africa, October 29-31, 2008, 
2.5 days 
AFROSAI-E, Training course for managers in performance auditing, Wilderness, South 
Africa, November 17-21, 2008, 4 days 
AFROSAI-E, Technical update work shop, Wilderness, South Africa, November 24-26, 
2008, 3 days  
AFROSAI-E, Long-term advisors meeting, Wilderness South Africa, November 28, 2008, 
1 day 
AFROSAI-E, Planning meeting with donors, Wilderness, South Africa, December 1-2,  





10  Former Manager, AFROSAI-E Secretariat  
11  Consultant, AFROSAI-E Secretariat  
12  Manager, AFROSAI-E Secretariat 
13  Assistant Manager, AFROSAI-E Secretariat 
14  Manager, AFROSAI-E Secretariat  
15  Technical Specialist, AFROSAI-E Secretariat        
16  Manager, AFROSAI-E Secretariat  
17  Manager, AFROSAI-E Secretariat  
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Office of the Auditor General Botswana  
20   Officer, OAG Botswana, June 22, 2009 
21   Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, June 22 and 26, 2009 and October 22, 2010  
22   Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, June 23, 2009  
23   Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, June 23, 2009 and October 22, 2010 
24   Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, June 23, 2009 and October 22, 2010  
25   Middle Manager, OAG Botswana, June 24, 2009 and October 17, 2010  
26 Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, June 24, 2009 
27 Middle Manager, OAG Botswana, June 25, 2009 
28 Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, June 26, 2009 and October 20, 2010 
29 Auditor, OAG Botswana, June 26, 2009 and October 17, 2010  
30 Auditor, OAG Botswana, October 17, 2010 
31 Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, October 17, 2010 
32 Auditor, OAG Botswana, October 20, 2010  
33 Auditor, OAG Botswana, October 20, 2010 
34 Officer, OAG Botswana, October 20, 2010 
35 Auditor, OAG Botswana, October 20, 2010 
36 Auditor, OAG Botswana, October 21, 2010 
37   Middle Manager, OAG Botswana, October 25, 2010 
 
 
Office of the Auditor General in Namibia 
40 Senior Manager, OAG Namibia, June 30, 2009 and October 28, 2010 
41 Senior Manager, OAG Namibia, July 1, 2009 and October 28, 2010  
42 Middle Manager, OAG Namibia, July 1, 2009 and October 28, 2010 
43 Senior Manager, OAG Namibia, July 2, 2009 
44 Middle Manager, OAG Namibia, July 2, 2009 
45 Senior Manager, OAG Namibia, July 2, 2009 
46 Senior Manager, OAG Namibia, July 3, 2009 
47 Senior Manager, OAG Namibia, July 6, 2009 
48 Auditor, OAG Namibia, June 30 and July 7, 2009 
49 Middle Manager, OAG Namibia, October 28, 2010 
50 Auditor, OAG Namibia, October 28, 2010 
51 Auditor, OAG Namibia, October 29, 2010 
52 Auditor, OAG Namibia, October 29, 2010  
53   Officer, OAG Namibia, November 1, 2010 
54 Officer, OAG Namibia, November 1, 2010 
55 Middle Manager, OAG Namibia, November 2, 2010 
56 Auditor, OAG Namibia, November 2, 2010  
57   Middle Manager, OAG Namibia, November 2, 2010 
58 Auditor, OAG Namibia, November 2, 2010 
59  Auditor, OAG Namibia, November 2, 2010 
 
 
